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POSITIVISM AND THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND 
JURISPRUDENCE* 
Dan Priel** 
 
 
Abstract. This short essay argues that legal philosophy has grown excessively insular. It identifies three 
ways in which this has happened: jurisprudence has become isolated from legal practice; it has adopted a 
methodology that encourages a separation between legal philosophy and other interdisciplinary 
approaches to law as well as other branches of philosophy; and it is committed to the substantive view 
that looks at law as a distinct social practice. The result has been a discipline that speaks on ever narrower 
problems mostly with itself. After presenting this state of affairs, the essay proposes various possible ways 
of changing jurisprudence to make it less isolated and more engaged. They include closer links with legal 
practice, political philosophy, science, and a rethinking of jurisprudential theories as models rather than a 
search for the “nature” of law. 
I. 
The mark of contemporary analytic jurisprudence is its intellectual isolation. I have in mind 
three kinds of isolation: 
(1) Isolation from legal practice: legal philosophy is largely uninterested in legal practice. It is not 
uncommon to find a book in legal philosophy that does not cite a single case or statute and 
seems little interested in the actual attitudes of legal practitioners. Indeed, the feeling one 
sometimes gets from jurisprudential work is that referring to actual legal practice is something 
of a philosophical sellout, that a concern for the everyday workings of a legal system is 
something that somehow undermines the purity of philosophical inquiry into law. When this 
attitude is coupled with the view that legal philosophy should focus only on those features that 
legal systems necessarily have, the result is the kind of inquiry that almost inevitably ignores 
almost every aspect of law. This attitude is sometimes accompanied by the view that considers 
looking for practical relevance to jurisprudential inquiries as somehow unnecessary or even 
wrong. Jurisprudential work is justified as the search for knowledge for its own sake, one that 
therefore need not have any practical relevance. It is even sometimes suggested that to look for 
such practical relevance—something that could serve as a check against this sort of isolation in 
jurisprudential work—is an ‘anti-philosophical’1 misunderstanding of what jurisprudence is 
about. The result is that the sort of object that remains for inquiry is not recognizably the law 
that most lawyers, or lay people, have in mind when they talk about law. Worse still, as a result 
of this isolation jurisprudence fails at achieving even the more modest aim of illuminating 
aspects of legal practice. Despite claims for providing a ‘descriptive’ account of the nature of law, 
the result is something that, I suspect, would be unrecognizable to most practitioners.  
                                                                    
* This essay summarizes in concise form some thoughts developed in other works of mine. For fuller 
argument see my essays cited below. 
** Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  
1 John Gardner, “Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths”, 46 American Journal of Jurisprudence 199, 203 (2001). Quite a 
few great philosophers, including some that Gardner mentions as founders of legal positivism were anti-
philosophical according to that standard.  
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(2) Isolationist methodology: the predominant view in legal philosophy is opposed to the 
relevance of potential insights from the natural and the social sciences.2 The main ‘device’ used 
is conceptual analysis from the so-called ‘internal point of view’. This expression means different 
things to different scholars, and here I will not try to disentangle all those different meanings. 
But in different ways they all use this expression to block inputs from other disciplines. For 
H.L.A. Hart, for example, the internal point of view, among other things, was contrasted with 
the methods of the natural sciences that he considered ‘useless’ for the purpose of explaining 
social normative phenomena. What Hart offered instead was armchair sociology. One might 
have thought Hart’s ‘descriptive’ approach that sought to understand normative behavior by 
appeal to certain people’s attitudes would look favorably to psychology for some closer insight 
into the way people actually reason. In reality, however, psychological literature has had little 
impact on his work or the work of the many legal philosophers who have sought to further 
develop his ideas.  
(3) Law as distinct from other things: If the first and second isolations were negative in nature, this 
one is part of the subject’s positive agenda. A second feature of the isolationist approach is the 
tendency to try to define law by distinguishing it from other things, instead of focusing on what 
law does or can do.3 The main focus of attention has been the boundary of law and morality, 
which consciously or not, has probably contributed to another kind of isolation, this time 
between legal philosophy and the rest of the legal academia, where it seems, a different 
boundary—between law and politics—has been the focus of greater attention.4  
A second, related, debate has been concerned with the boundary between different 
jurisprudential theories, one between legal positivism and natural law, and increasingly in 
recent years among legal positivists themselves. At times these debates developed to a meta-
debate, not about the boundaries between law and morality, but on the correct way of 
understanding the boundaries between competing jurisprudential theories. In both cases, after 
much work, it often seemed that what distinguishes the competing factions is very little indeed.  
                                                                    
2 On this matter I say much more in “Jurisprudence between Science and the Humanities”, 4 
Washington University Jurisprudence Review (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1566858, 
and Dan Priel, “Toward Classical Legal Positivism”, unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1886517. 
3 Legal positivists have been much influenced here by the work of Joseph Raz. See in particular his 
“Legal Principles and the Limits of Law”, 81 Yale Law Journal 823 (1972). For recent statements on the 
significance of this inquiry see John Gardner, “Nearly Natural Law”, 52 American Journal of Jurisprudence 1, 13-
14 (2007); Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) ch. 1. 
4 If we are to believe Duncan Kennedy, “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000”, 
in David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos (eds.), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 19, 21, then the boundary between law and morality is typically a 
mid-to-late nineteenth century concern, whereas the concern with the boundary between law and 
politics is the one dominating discussion in legal circles in this era. I think this is largely correct and 
reflects the massive growth of law that came with the advent of the welfare state, a development that 
inevitably forced law into much greater contact with politics. These developments have had no 
discernable impact on analytic jurisprudence.  
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II. 
Hart, and the brand of legal positivism he inaugurated, played a major role in establishing these 
isolations (hence my rather unkind homage to the title to his classic essay).5 We now know that 
Hart had relatively little interest in the work of most legal academics;6 that he sought to 
translate the question “what is law?” to the question of the connections and boundaries between 
law and morality;7 that he considered his work as primarily methodologically neutral, and that 
he explicitly defended a methodology of “understanding” that was designed to fulfill a task 
scientific method could not.8 The way the domain of “general jurisprudence” is currently 
understood, with its concern with the question of the “nature” of law, with the primary given in 
it to legal validity, are all products of his isolationist attitude. 
In some respect this approach has been a spectacular success story: it effectively created a 
new area of inquiry. Legal philosophy, as the term is currently understood, did not exist before 
the twentieth century. This may sound like an audacious claim, and obviously false one—what 
about Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Bentham, Kant (the list goes on and on)? Where they 
not legal philosophers? In a sense they were, but their work was not within that unique genre 
that is twentieth century analytic jurisprudence. What I mean by this is an intellectual domain 
that may be defined as “the philosophical inquiry about law that is (or purports to be) non-
normative”. None of these thinkers, nor the many other philosophers who wrote about law 
throughout the centuries could be said to have engaged in this sort of inquiry. Indeed, before the 
twentieth century the conscious division between jurisprudence (in this sense) and moral and 
political philosophy simply did not exist. To see the difference consider between the old and the 
new jurisprudence note that the concern with legal validity, that is so central to contemporary 
jurisprudence, is conspicuously absent from earlier works. 
As a result the works of many philosophers who do not fit this mold are now often 
neglected. Bizarrely, not to say perversely, the one pre-twentieth century philosopher whose 
work is closest in spirit to contemporary jurisprudence is John Austin, a minor figure in the 
history of thought. Together with Hart he became a founding father of sorts of contemporary 
jurisprudence,9 at the expense of the complete neglect of the work of the much greater lights of, 
                                                                    
5 Hans Kelsen probably bears a considerable share as well, but at least in the English speaking world 
his direct influence is less pronounced. His indirect influence, however, is probably immense, for it is 
through him, I think, that Anglophone legal philosophy received the idea, developed earlier in German 
legal positivist circles of making “legal validity” the primary concept of jurisprudence. I make these claims 
tentatively as they deserve further investigation. 
6 See Nicola Lacey, “Analytical Jurisprudence versus Descriptive Sociology Revisited” 84 Texas Law 
Review 945, 951-53 (2006). 
7 See H.L.A. Hart, “Legal Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals”, 71 Harvard Law Review 593 
(1958); H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 7-8. Here it was also the work 
of Joseph Raz that has been very influential. 
8 See “Jurisprudence between Science and the Humanities”, supra note 2, at 36-38. On the contrast 
between (humanistic) “understanding” and (scientific) “explanation” see G.H. von Wright, Explanation and 
Understanding (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1971). 
9 In my view there has been a subtle and unacknowledged shift from Austin to Hart in the way the 
domain of jurisprudence has been understood. See Dan Priel, “H.L.A. Hart and the Invention of Legal 
Philosophy,” 5 Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934953.  
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say, David Hume, Adam Smith, Henry Sidgwick, all of whom wrote about law in a manner that 
does not fit the narrow mold of analytic jurisprudence. Even Thomas Bentham and Jeremy 
Hobbes, often considered early proponents of legal positivism, had to have many of their ideas 
ignored and others “Austinified” in order to fir the strictures of contemporary analytic 
jurisprudence.  
Within these strictures, that is, when accepting the three isolations, legal positivism is true 
almost by definition. Once again, you may think I am exaggerating: aren’t, say, Ronald Dworkin 
or John Finnis analytic legal philosophers, who are not legal positivists? Analytic jurisprudence, 
so the argument goes, is a set of research questions (primarily the concern with the question 
“what is law?”) and a commitment to a particular method of addressing those questions (the 
application of the methods of analytic philosophy to questions about law). Nothing in that leads 
inevitably to legal positivism. The truth, however, that the three isolations go beyond these 
commitments to subject-matter and method. Dworkin, despite sharing some of the isolationist 
tendencies identified above, has sought to draw some links to the work of practicing lawyers, to 
other fields in philosophy, as well as to the work of other legal academics. In the case of Finnis, 
the way this was done was a bit more subtle: Finnis has engaged in discussion with the more 
isolationist ‘descriptive’ work of Hart and Raz, but he has made it clear now that his work on 
natural law is “normative, practical, moral.”10 but in the very same book he rejected a central 
tenet of the isolationist attitude: the concern to separate jurisprudence from normative inquiry. 
In his more recent writings in jurisprudence, he has been more explicit in rejecting the 
presuppositions of Hart’s work.11 
 There is thus an ironic twist to Brian Leiter’s claim that “legal positivism stands as 
victorious as any research program in post-World War II philosophy”.12 In a sense he is right: as 
legal philosophy did not exist (in the sense explained above) before the twentieth century and as 
legal positivism is in effect analytic jurisprudence with the three isolations, there is a sense in 
which Leiter is clearly right. But, and this is the heart of my argument, this has been a pyrrhic 
victory, for it was achieved by effectively defining competition away from the debate. The terms 
of the debate—what was considered as part of the “permissible” moves within it—were set in 
such a way that legal positivism was bound to end up “victorious.” By defining legal philosophy 
as concerned primarily with the nature of law, by defining the nature of law as understood by 
the conditions of legal validity, and by defining legal validity as understood by practitioners (and 
not as the result of a broader normative inquiry), the “winner” in the debate was simply not in 
question.  
The interesting question, then, is why the isolationist approach has proven so attractive to 
legal philosophers? This question is, of course, not susceptible to a simple answer. For Hart, for 
example, part of the story probably had to do with his ethical (or rather metaethical) skepticism. 
Isolating legal philosophy from moral philosophy allowed him to avoid the need to engage with 
                                                                    
10 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 418. 
11 See John Finnis, “Law and What I Truly Should Decide,” 48 American Journal of Jurisprudence 107 (2003); 
John Finnis, “H.L.A. Hart: A Twentieth Century Oxford Political Philosopher,” 54 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 161 (2009). I discuss the differences between Finnis’s methodology and that of analytic 
jurisprudents at greater length in Dan Priel, “Description and Evaluation in Jurisprudence,” 29 Law and 
Philosophy 633 (2010). 
12 Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and on Naturalism in Legal Philosophy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 2. 
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a question he felt unsure about.13 Via a somewhat different route the same is true of Kelsen 
(whose ethical skepticism was more strongly and explicitly pronounced). The time in which 
both wrote their main works in jurisprudence was also a period in which political philosophy 
was thought “dead,”14 and so it may have seemed fruitless to attempt to tie legal philosophy to 
political philosophy. But beyond these rather narrow concerns, there was perhaps also an idea, 
probably not fully recognized in Hart’s work, but I think increasingly clear and intended as we 
approach the present, that the isolationist approach could secure legal philosophy from being 
overtaken by any other discipline. This may have reduced the opportunities for interactions 
with other disciplines, but—what is in fact the very same thing—those other disciplines could 
not pose a serious challenge to legal philosophy. In other words, isolationism meant both that 
from within the “truth” of legal positivism could not be questioned, and from without the 
questions and methods legal philosophy could not be challenged.  
That this was a pyrrhic victory can be seen from the status of the subject in legal academia. 
It is no secret—and I have encountered such attitudes myself from many people—that analytic 
jurisprudence is no longer held in high regard in many law schools. I have heard many scholars 
with background or interest in philosophy saying that they do not find the debates in the area 
interesting. I have heard it from younger scholars in the United States that work in this area is 
not likely to get one hired. Even in Britain where analytic jurisprudence is more prominent, in 
an increasing number of law schools analytic jurisprudence is often considered a spent force. 
The response one sometimes encounters among legal philosophers is that this lack of interest is 
due to the fact that most academic lawyers are not philosophically sophisticated enough, or 
simply not smart enough, to understand the debates. It is notable, however, that other 
philosophers, including moral and political philosophers, presumably sufficiently intelligent 
and philosophically astute, and working on close issues, seem equally uninterested in these 
debates. I have even heard it suggested that general jurisprudence is no longer attractive because 
its major questions have been, more or less, solved. That, however, to me reflects more an 
implication of the isolationist attitude noted above than reality. The questions of jurisprudence 
seem to have been solved only because the isolationist attitude eliminated the possibility of real 
debate. 
A crisp demonstration of the shift that the isolationist attitude has brought about can be 
gleaned from a subtle but important shift in the meaning of “general jurisprudence.” These days 
the term typically means that part of jurisprudence that talks about law in general, as opposed 
to philosophical or theoretical discussion on tort, contract, intellectual property or what have 
you. It is interesting to compare this to the two close but different contrasts in Bentham’s work. 
Bentham distinguished between universal and local jurisprudence and between expositor and 
the censor. The local/universal distinction was about “the law of such or such a nation or 
nations in particular” as opposed to the “the law of all nations whatsoever.” The 
expositor/censor distinction was about the distinction between “what the law is” and “what it 
ought to be,”15 or in modern more parlance, roughly between the work of the doctrinal (“black 
letter”) and that of the legal reformer. With regard to the “definition which there has been 
                                                                    
13 Hart comes close to admitting that in Hart, supra note 7, at 620-21. 
14 For these attitudes toward political theory (especially in Oxford) around this period see Brian Barry, 
Political Argument, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) xxxi-xxxviii. 
15 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 
293-95. 
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occasion here and there to intersperse” in his discussion, “particularly the definition … given of 
the word law,” he considered it to belong to universal jurisprudence, although he warned (a 
warning not always heeded by contemporary legal philosophers) that this usage may be 
inaccurate since “in point of usage, where a man, in laying down what he apprehends to be the 
law, extends his views to a few of the nations with which his own  is most connected”. It is, 
rather, in the “censorial line”, the normative domain that considers particular legal areas in 
which “there is the greatest room for disquisitions that apply to the circumstances of all nations 
alike”.16 It is this that allowed Bentham to offer his legislation drafting services for the whole 
world. In other words, for the most part it was the censorial (normative) work that belonged to 
universal jurisprudence, whereas the more “descriptive” expository work (what we would now 
call doctrinal scholarship) that was local. 
The redefinition of general jurisprudence as the part of the discussion not concerned with 
particular legal areas only makes sense, is in fact necessary, to maintain one of the isolation of 
jurisprudence from political theory.   
III. 
Legal philosophy can continue to exist in the same way it has been existing for some time now, 
as a niche subject that interests an ever smaller number of people, devoid of important questions 
and interesting answers. Alternatively, it can abandon the misguided Platonic search for a set of 
necessary features that all laws have and join the rest of the academic world. I started with three 
isolations that pervade contemporary jurisprudence. The first step to renewal would come from 
trying to adopt their opposites. What this means is for the most part rather self-explanatory, but 
a few comments may be in order: 
(1) Jurisprudents should take more interest in legal practice and through it in politics and political theory. Too 
many debates in jurisprudence are not about law but about the writings of other legal 
philosophers. This is to a great extent inevitable. Part of the life of any intellectual discipline 
consists of refining and challenging past ideas. But jurisprudence seems to have lost touch with 
what it is supposed to be about: law at the expense of often scholastic debates among legal 
philosophers.17 Here are some topics that are properly “general” and theoretical but do not fit 
mainstream views as to what general jurisprudence should be about: the relationship between 
law and other social institutions; law in a democracy; comparative jurisprudence; law in the 
welfare state; the role and significance of path dependency in the law; evolutionary ideas in the 
law; law and well-being; the political aspects of legal taxonomy; what psychological research 
about morality and politics tells us about the shape law has taken, and many others. All these 
topics will force legal philosophers to think more and more clearly about the actual practice of 
law. As I see it, these questions are not merely efforts at diversifying or branching out. Properly 
thought through they will prove valuable to anyone interested in an answer to the question 
“what is law?”  
                                                                    
16 Ibid. at 295; cf. Dan Priel, “One Right Answer? The Meta-Edition,” in W.J. Waluchow and Stefan 
Schiaraffa, ed., The Nature of Law (forthcoming 2012), available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=1835982. 
17 For similar observations and a call, with which I fully agree, for greater attention to the work of 
legal theorists who paid more attention to legal practice see Sundram Soosay, “Rediscovering Fuller and 
Llewellyn: Law as Custom and Process” in Maksymilian Del Mar, ed., New Waves in Philosophy of Law (London: 
Routledge, 2011) 31. 
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(2) Jurisprudents should embrace science: science is the greatest success story of the last three 
centuries. And the success shows no signs of abating. Area after area that we were once told were 
beyond the realm of science have proven up to the task. Jurisprudence has gone in the opposite 
direction. The historical route leading from Hobbes and Bentham to Hart and Raz is one that 
involves the successive cutting of whatever ties to science were left there by earlier generations 
of legal philosophers. In its final stages it was the result of a conscious commitment to the view 
that the fundamental questions of jurisprudence are beyond the ken of science, that 
philosophical reflection is fundamentally different and in some respect opposed to scientific one. 
As we have seen this attitude required both a commitment to what properly belonged to 
jurisprudence and to a certain corresponding methodology. I believe there is little to support 
this view and many reasons to reject it. Philosophers in other areas increasingly recognize that 
science is their friend, not their enemy; legal philosophers should follow suit.  
(3) Jurisprudents should attempt to offer models of law instead of identifying its essence or nature: Instead of the 
search for necessary conditions for the “nature” of law, instead of looking for the existence 
conditions that all legal systems necessarily have, legal philosophers should aim to compare 
what may be called “models” of law. This approach aims to identify not all the features that 
something must have in order to be law, but rather some features that help explain certain 
important features about law. The aim here is to recognize that illumination in the explanation 
of social institutions often comes from isolating certain features and offering a simplified 
mechanism that explains them. In the context of law this could mean at least two different 
things. One is the recognition that laws in different environments (pre-modern versus modern; 
democratic versus non-democratic; in a contemporary welfare state versus before the welfare 
state; in a globalized world versus the pre-globalized world) have to address different concerns 
and that therefore concepts like the rule of law, obligation, or coercion, have therefore taken a 
different shape. Different models can illustrate these differences. The second way is even more 
interesting: we often recognize that the same function can be performed in different ways. A 
steam engine and an internal combustion engine both perform a similar function even though 
the way they do so is different. Similarly, different legal systems may perform the same function 
through different mechanisms. Once again, jurisprudence could help not only identify 
functions that legal systems perform but also suggest different models for the different ways in 
which these functions may be realized.  
IV. 
If what I said above is true, it will mean the death of legal philosophy as the term is currently 
understood by many of its practitioners. That is not to be lamented. It may also lead to the death 
of legal philosophy in the broader sense of the term—philosophical reflection about law—as a 
viable object of inquiry. This sort of inquiry might end up subsumed (in the way it used to be 
subsumed) under moral or political philosophy, or social philosophy, or another discipline 
altogether (political science, psychology). Perhaps this is the ultimate fate of an attempt at 
philosophical inquiry of a social phenomenon. Perhaps jurisprudence will be able to reinvent 
itself in an interesting and novel manner, as the “location” for gathering the insights from 
various disciplines none of which takes special interest in the law. Jurisprudence thus 
understood might be the name we give to the attempt to come up with a unifying account of 
those different perspectives on law. This may prove the end of jurisprudence as we know it. This 
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means legal philosophers face a dilemma: either continue in the same manner jurisprudence is 
practiced today, slowly but steadily becoming less and less relevant, less and less read, and less 
and less cared for; or reinvent it in some way. Paradoxically, it is the former approach that is 
more likely to keep jurisprudence alive, simply because the three isolations have created such a 
secure bubble for jurisprudence that no other discipline could challenge it; and as a result of the 
marginalization of jurisprudence that came with the three isolations, no-one would bother. But 
in this way jurisprudence will be alive in the same way that a man in a coma is alive. Making 
jurisprudence relevant risks the eliminating it as a distinct sub-discipline, as it will no longer be 
able to claim for itself a unique set of questions that are beyond the purview of other disciplines. 
I think it is a risk worth taking. 
